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The Illiberal Abuse of Constitutional Courts in Europe 
Pablo Castillo Ortiz* 
Abstract 
Legal constitutionalism ± Political constitutionalism - Emergence of illiberal 
constitutionalism as a tertium genus ± Examination of constitutional courts under three 
illiberal governments: Poland, Hungary, and Turkey - Illiberal governments¶ strategies to 
seize control of constitutional courts ± Illiberal governments¶ aim to secure leverage over 
constitutional judges and restrict the powers of review of the court - Constitutional courts 
under illiberal rule invert the traditional functions that were assigned to them under the 
original Kelsenian approach - Instead of a check on power, illiberal constitutional courts 
become a device to circumvent constitutional constraints and concentrate power in the 
hands of the ruling actors - 
Introduction 
 
Illiberal governments are on the rise in Europe. Within the European Union, executives, 
first in Hungary and then in Poland, have attempted to severely weaken checks and 
balances and accumulate power into the hands of ruling political actors. In the European 
Union¶V LPPHGLDWH neighbourhood, Turkey has followed a similar path. Surprisingly, 
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illiberalism is gaining momentum on a continent that has for decades been considered at 
the avant-garde of liberal democracy and human rights values, giving rise in certain 
countries to dramatic changes in internal political systems and processes of rule of law 
backsliding1.  
When they reach power, illiberal actors often engage in constitutional politics through 
processes of constitution-making, constitution-amendment or reform of constitutional 
institutions. Following Landau, we can define illiberal constitutionalism as a 
constitutional model LQZKLFKµSRZHUIXOLQFXPEHQWSUHVLGHQWVDQGSDUWLHVFDQHQJLQHHU
constitutional change so as to make themselves very difficult to dislodge and so as to 
GHIXVHLQVWLWXWLRQVVXFKDVFRXUWVWKDWDUHLQWHQGHGWRFKHFNWKHLUH[HUFLVHVDVSRZHU¶2. 
Illiberalism can be understood as related to, but conceptually different from, populism. 
This latter term, populism, has been defined from different and sometimes conflicting 
angles in academia. According to )RQWDQD µSRSXOLVP JHQHUDOO\ UHIHUV WR DUJXPHQWV
pitting a large number of average people unjustly disempowered relative to and against 
VRPHSRZHUHOLWH¶3. Note, however, the normative element µXQMXVWO\¶ in this account of 
the term. Mudde offers a different definition that has the advantage of being free of value 
judgements. ,Q0XGGH¶V view, populism is µDWKLQ-centred ideology that considers society 
WR EH XOWLPDWHO\ VHSDUDWHG LQWR WZR KRPRJHQHRXV DQG DQWDJRQLVWLF JURXSV ³WKH SXUH
SHRSOH´ YHUVXV³WKHFRUUXSWHOLWH´DQGZKLFKDUJXHVWKDWSROLWLFVVKRXOGEHDQH[SUHVVLRQ
                                                          
1
 /3HFKDQG./DQH6FKHSSHOHµ,OOLEHUDOLVP:LWKLQ5XOHRI/DZ%DFNVOLGLQJLQWKH(8¶ CYELS 
(2017) p. 3 at p.10. 
2
 1RWH WKDW /DQGDX UHIHUV WR WKLV SKHQRPHQRQ DV µDEXVLYH FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶ ' /DQGDX µ$EXVLYH
ConstitutionalLVP¶UC Davies Law Review (2013) p. 189 at p.191. 
3
 ')RQWDQDµ8QEXQGOLQJ3RSXOLVP¶UCLA Law Review (2018) p. 1482 at p.1486. 
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RIWKHYRORQWpJpQpUDOHJHQHUDOZLOORIWKHSHRSOH´4. Finally, Pappas defines populism 
DVµGHPRFUDWLFLOOLEHUDOLVP¶, one of whose characteristics is µWKHDGKHUHQFHWRWKHPDMRULW\
principle, as well as a certain predilection for personalist authority over impersonal 
LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGWKHUXOHRIODZ¶5. In this regard, the illiberal undertones of populism can 
be observed in its rejection of both constitutional restrictions on state power and also the 
protection of the rights of minorities6.   
Probably given their nature as a constraint on power, constitutional courts are among the 
institutions most frequently put under stress by illiberals in power. The political science 
literature on judicial actors under authoritarian regimes has suggested a number of 
functions that courts fulfil in these systems7. Diverse authors mention pro-regime roles, 
such as the bolstering of administrative discipline8or the cohesion of the ruling elite9. 
However, as suggested by Moustafa, courts can also serve as sites of active resistance, 
                                                          
4
 &0XGGHµ$UH3RSXOLVWV)ULHQGVRU)RHVRI&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP"¶The Foundation for Law, Justice and 
Society Policy Brief (2013), at p.3; C. Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist, 39 Government and Opposition 
(2004) p. 541 at p.543 
5
 7 3DSSDV µ3RSXOLVW 'HPRFUDFLHV 3RVW-Authoritarian Greece and Post-&RPPXQLVW +XQJDU\¶ 
Government and Opposition (2014) p.1 at p.4. 
6
 Mudde 2013, supra n.4, p.3 
7
 6HH70RXVWDIDµ/DZDQG&RXUWVLQ$XWKRULWDULDQ5HJLPHV¶ Annual Review of Law and Social Science 
(2014) p 281 
8
 M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (University of Chicago Press 1981); R. 
Peerenboom, &KLQD¶V/RQJ March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press 2002). 
9
 R. Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution 
(Cambridge University Press 2002); A. Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil 
(Princeton University Press 1971). 
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giving opposition actors opportunities to contest government policies10. In the legal field, 
in addition to the study of fundamental traits of illiberal constitutionalism11, a number of 
works have described the changes to constitutional courts carried out by illiberal 
governments12, as well as the reactions to those changes at the level of supranational 
institutions such as the EU13. 
Despite the existence of these valuable contributions, important questions of 
constitutional theory in relation to the latest wave of illiberalism in Europe remain 
unexplored. Constitutional courts are frequently understood in constitutional theory as a 
constraint on power and an instrument of protection of the normativity of the 
constitution14. At the same time, as we have seen, illiberal actors do not readily accept the 
idea of limitations to their rule. Paradoxically, when they come to power, illiberals do not 
usually suppress constitutional courts. Instead, they carry out far-reaching reforms 
relating to the design and powers of these institutions which deeply mutate their nature 
                                                          
10
 Moustafa, supra n. 7. 
11
 Landau, supra n. 2; Mudde 2013, supra n.4; L.-$7KLRµ&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPLQ,OOLEHUDO3ROLWLHV¶LQ0
Rosenfeld and A. Sajó (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, (Oxford University 
Press 2012) p.133. 
12
 %%XJDULþDQG7*LQVEXUJµ7KH$VVDXOWRQ3RVW-Communist Courts, 27 The Journal of Democracy 
(2016), p. 69 
13
 Pech and Lane Scheppele, supra n.1; C. Closa and D. Kochenov (Eds) Reinforcing the Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union &DPEULGJH 8QLYHUVLW\ 3UHVV  ' .HOHPHQ µ(XURSH¶V 2WKHU
'HPRFUDWLF 'HILFLW 1DWLRQDO $XWKRULWDULDQLVP LQ (XURSH¶V 'HPRFUDWLF 8QLRQ¶  Government and 
Opposition (2017) p. 211. 
14
 +.HOVHQ µ-XGLFLDO5HYLHZRI/HJLVODWLRQ$&RPSDUDWive Study of the Austrian and the American 
Constitution', 4 The Journal of Politics  S $ 6WRQH 6ZHHW µ7KH 3ROLWLFV RI &RQVWLWXWLRQDO
5HYLHZLQ)UDQFHDQG(XURSH¶I-Con (2007) p. 69.  
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and functions. We know that illiberal governments prefer a constitutional setting that 
concentrates power in their hands. We also know that they favour a type of 
constitutionalism that weakens opposition and favours their long-term rule15. But if that 
is the case, what role does a reformed constitutional court perform with regards to the 
protection of the constitution and its normativity in an illiberal system?  
To respond to this question, this article combines an examination of three constitutional 
courts under illiberal governments with a legal-theoretical analysis. The countries 
covered are Poland, Hungary and Turkey, which have been selected because they 
constitute the most prominent examples of the latest wave of illiberalism in Europe and 
Eurasia, as well as the instances in which processes of µilliberalisation¶ are most complete.  
At the constitutional-theoretical level, this article aims to show that illiberal constitutional 
courts perform functions that are incompatible with any of the main constitutional 
traditions in Europe. In doing so, the article seeks to advance the theoretical knowledge 
about such institutions and their relation to liberal forms of constitutionalism, as well as 
their functional role in what I call the µGH-normativisDWLRQ¶RIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOWH[WVIn the 
countries under study, constitutional courts under illiberal governments were originally 
presented simply as Kelsenian courts, fulfilling the same functions as their counterparts 
in other European countries. More recently, the argument has been put forward that the 
changes to constitutional courts in these countries represent a turn towards the postulates 
of political constitutionalism16. I rebut such claims and instead argue that illiberal 
constitutional courts are irreconcilable with the standards and the telos of both those two 
                                                          
15
 See Landau, supra n.2. 
16
 $&]DUQRWDµ7KH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO7ULEXQDO¶Verfassungsblog, 3 June 2017, www.verfassungsblog.de/the-
constitutional-tribunal/ visited 25 November 2017. 
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approaches to constitutionalism, especially when it comes to the protection of the 
constitution. Furthermore, given that the defence of illiberal constitutional courts from a 
political constitutionalism perspective is in fact rather novel, this article constitutes - to 
WKHEHVWRIWKLVDXWKRU¶VNQRZOHGJH - one of the first attempts at refuting such a defence.  
Parallel to suggesting that illiberal constitutional courts are incompatible with both legal 
and political constitutionalism, I argue that such institutions fulfil a specific, sui generis 
function that is central to illiberal constitutionalism. Instead of enforcing the constitution, 
they are devices that allow illiberal governments to circumvent the constitutional text in 
the context of weakened political constraints. This results in a loss of normative force of 
the constitution, thus undermining the very foundations of the rule of law in these 
countries17. 
In order to ground the constitutional-theoretical discussion, the article first makes an 
analysis of the cases, identifying common patterns but also identifying differences among 
them. As will be shown, the governments of all three countries had similar goals in mind 
when reforming their constitutional courts: obtaining leverage over constitutional judges 
while disempowering the institution. However, the strategies that they followed to do so 
were largely different. In this regard, the article argues that the causes underlying these 
                                                          
17
 See, on this argument, the case of Venezuela, A. R.  Brewer-&DUtDVµ(OMXH]FRQVWLWXFLRQDODOVHUYLFLRGHO
autoritarismo y la ilegítima mutación de la constitución: el caso de la sala constitucional del Tribunal 
Supremo de Venezuela (1999-¶Revista de Administración Pública (2009) p. 387. For Poland, 
VHH : 6DGXUVNL µ+RZ 'HPRFUDF\ 'LHV LQ 3RODQG $ &DVH 6WXG\ RI $QWL-Constitutional Populist 
%DFNVOLGLQJ¶Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper (2018) 18/01. 
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different strategies are a combination of control over the constitution18 and pre-existing 
leverage over constitutional judges. 
The remainder of this article is as follows. I begin by presenting the two most important 
constitutional traditions in Europe, legal constitutionalism and political constitutionalism. 
Then I explain the reforms relating to the constitutional courts of illiberal governments in 
three countries: Hungary, Poland, and Turkey. In the following section, I return to 
constitutional theory and show that the cases analysed fail to meet the underlying 
assumptions of both Kelsenian-inspired legal constitutionalism and political 
constitutionalism with regards to the protection of the constitution and democracy. 
Instead, as I argue in the penultimate section, constitutional courts under illiberal 
governments become devices intended to manipulate the constitution, thus partially 
depriving the constitutional text of its normative force. This is followed by a conclusion. 
 
 
The great disagreement: constitutional review in constitutional theory 
 
The constitutional landscape in Europe has so far been mostly dominated by two different 
traditions: legal constitutionalism and political constitutionalism. While these two 
approaches share an emphasis on constraining power within liberal-democratic systems 
of government, they largely diverge in their approach to arrangements such as the 
constitutional review of legislation or the existence of an entrenched constitution. The 
                                                          
18
 6HH%%XJDULþµ$&ULVLVRI&RQVWLWXWLRQDO'HPRFUDF\LQ3RVW-Communist Europe: ³/DQGVLQ-EHWZHHQ´
'HPRFUDF\DQG$XWKRULWDULDQLVP¶I-Con (2015) p. 219 at p.230. 
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emergence of illiberal constitutional practices in Europe has added further complexity to 
this scenario.  
In this section, I shall present the central tenets of legal constitutionalism and political 
constitutionalism, with a particular focus on their views on the constitutional review of 
legislation and the role of judicial actors in the political process. Such a presentation 
constitutes the theoretical background against which the rest of the article develops one 
of its central claims: that the illiberal construction of constitutional courts is incompatible 
with both of these constitutional traditions and, instead, constitutes a new approach to 
constitutional review. 
 
 
a. Legal constitutionalism: the promise of better-defended democracy 
 
In legal constitutionalism, dominant in most European jurisdictions, legalistic checks on 
power play a powerful role in the functioning of the political system. This approach to 
constitutional design defends the idea of a normative, entrenched constitution whose 
provisions are to be respected by political actors19. When necessary, a judicial-type 
institution, often a constitutional court, has the power to invalidate statutes on the grounds 
that they are contrary to the constitution20.  
                                                          
19
 Stone Sweet, supra n. 14, p.74. 
20
 Stone Sweet, supra n. 14, p.74-75. 
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The dominant approach to constitutional review in legal constitutionalism in Europe can 
be traced back to the thought of the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen21. As is well known, 
Kelsen conceived of legal systems as being constructed upon a hierarchical structure in 
which every rule of the system derives its validity from a superior rule. At the top of the 
hierarchy of positive legal norms sits a constitution, which is the ultimate source of the 
validity of the rest of the rules and the legal system as a whole22.  
Given the fundamental importance of the constitution in his thinking, Kelsen was 
concerned with the problem of the uniformity of its interpretation23. His response to this 
challenge was to concentrate these powers of constitutional interpretation in a single 
institution. In his view, this function could not be entrusted to a political actor since µLIDQ
institution is to be created at all that will control the constitutionality of certain acts of 
state immediate to the constitution, in particular those of parliament and government, this 
power of control must not be conferred upon one of the organs whose acts are to be 
VXEMHFWHGWRFRQWURO¶24.  Instead, Kelsen favoured a solution in which the monopoly of 
constitutional interpretation was given to a specialised court. Kelsenian constitutional 
courts were thus born commanding a monopoly over the capacity to declare legislation 
unconstitutional, thus protecting the constitution from violation by the political branches 
of government while at the same time ensuring homogeneity in the interpretation of the 
constitutional text.  
                                                          
21
 See Kelsen, supra n.14.  
22
 H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (The Lawbook Exchange 2009[1967]). 
23
 Kelsen, supra n. 14, at pp.185-186. 
24
 +.HOVHQµ:KRRXJKWWREHWKHJXDUGLDQRIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQ".HOVHQ¶VUHSO\WR6FKPLWW¶ LQ/9LQ[
(ed.), The Guardian of the Constitution. Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2015 [1931]) p. 174 at p. 175. 
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In the original Kelsenian approach, the constitutional court was also a legal-political 
device to guarantee the preservation of democracy against authoritarian temptations from 
the political branches of government. Kelsen¶VGHEDWHZLWK Carl Schmitt is of fundamental 
importance in this respect, given that in those writings the Austrian jurist explicitly 
claimed that the idea of a constitutional court was an instrument to prevent totalitarianism: 
µ7KHWXUQWRWKH³WRWDOVWDWH´is opposed to constitutional adjudication, first of all, insofar 
as the call for constitutional adjudication is interpreWHGDVDQDWWHPSWWRLPSHGHWKLV³WXUQ´
and with it the process of the solidification and consolidation of the state, its victory over 
VRFLHW\¶25.  
This idea, the protection of democracy by constitutional courts, became determinant for 
the adoption of Kelsenian courts in post-war Europe. After the war, in the processes of 
transition from totalitarian or authoritarian regimes to democracy, many European 
countries established Kelsenian-inspired constitutional courts as a response to the 
breakdown of democracy in the previous decades26. Furthermore, unlike in the original 
Kelsenian design, these courts were now empowered to enforce constitutional catalogues 
of fundamental rights.27 Kelsenian style constitutional courts were often created in 
countries that had experienced totalitarian or authoritarian regimes with the hope of 
stabilising those young democracies. In other words, they were a mechanism for the 
protection of democracy from authoritarian threats. Against this background, and given 
that most European countries experienced authoritarian regimes at some point in the 20th 
                                                          
25
 Kelsen, supra n. 24, p.202 
26
 %XJDULþDQG*LQVEXUJsupra n.12, p.72. 
27
 $6WRQH6ZHHWµ:K\(XURSH5HMHFWHG$PHULFDQ-XGLFLDO5HYLHZ$QG:K\,W0D\1RW0DWWHU¶
Michigan Law Review (2003), p. 2744 at p.2767-6HHDOVR$6WRQH6ZHHWµ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO
&RXUWVDQG3DUOLDPHQWDU\'HPRFUDF\¶West European Politics (2002) p. 77 at p.81-82. 
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Century, Kelsenian-style constitutional courts became the most frequent mechanism of 
constitutional review on the continent28. While they remain relatively young institutions, 
in Europe, they have already consolidated their standing as central to the political-
constitutional landscape. 
 
 
b. Political constitutionalism: defending democracy against 
judicialisation 
 
Contrary to proponents of legal constitutionalism, political constitutionalists reject the 
idea that courts should overturn the decisions of democratically elected politicians. For 
political constitutionalists, a healthy democratic system is one in which political conflicts 
are solved by political means and in which judicial actors defer to the democratically-
elected legislature when it comes to the decisions on the general rules that regulate 
society.  
In Britain, the foundational moment of political constitutionalism as a school of thought 
can be traced back to J.A.G. Griffith¶V leFWXUHRQµ7KH3ROLWLFDO&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶29. Griffith¶s 
approach to constitutionalism is structured around the importance of the legislature, 
which is the ultimate institutional seat of power and the main constraint on government 
action30. His is a ³thin´ FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPLQZKLFKµSROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQVVKRXOGEHWDNHQE\
                                                          
28
 V. Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values (Yale University Press, 2009) 
29
 J.A.G. GrLIILWKµ7KH3ROLWLFDO&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶Modern Law Review (1979), p. 1. 
30
 See Griffith, supra n. 29, p.15 
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SROLWLFLDQV¶31, therefore rejecting the idea of constitutional review. More particularly, 
Griffith argues against the idea of a judicially enforceable Bill of Rights and strong legal 
constraints on political power. In his view, µWKRVH IRU DZULWWHQ FRQVWLWXWLRQ D %LOO RI
Rights, a supreme court, and the rest are attempts to resolve political conflicts in our 
society in a particular way, to minimise change, to maintain (so far as possible) the 
H[LVWLQJGLVWULEXWLRQRISROLWLFDOSRZHU¶32. The British scholar considered rights to be no 
PRUHWKDQSROLWLFDOFODLPVWKHFRUROODU\RIWKLVEHLQJWKDWµWKHLUDFFHSWDQFH or rejection 
EHLQWKHKDQGVRISROLWLFLDQVUDWKHUWKDQMXGJHV¶33. 
*ULIILWK¶Vcritique of constitutional review and judicially enforceable bills of rights has 
been developed by subsequent scholarship on political constitutionalism, which usually 
shares a common approach to the relationship between public law and politics. As said 
by ThornhLOOµLQSROLWLFDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPW\SLFDOO\SXEOLFODZLVH[SHFWHGWRRULJLQDWH
in some expression of constituent power, fixed counterweights to the exercise of popular 
SRZHU«KDYHOHVVLQIOXHQFHLQQHU-societal demands and conflicts are directed more 
openly through the political system, and the legislative branch of the political system is 
GLUHFWO\ DFFRXQWDEOH WR D UHSUHVHQWHG SXEOLF ZLOO¶34 Additionally, in general, political 
constitutionalists favour legislative supremacy and oppose constitutional review, albeit 
for a number of different reasons and with different emphases,Q%HOODP\¶VUHSXEOLFDQ
strand of this constitutional tradition, constitutional review is incompatible with the idea 
of freedom as non-domination, given the asymmetrical power it gives to judges vis-à-vis 
                                                          
31
 Griffith, supra n. 29, p.16. 
32
 Griffith, supra n. 29, p.17. 
33
 Griffith, supra n. 29, p.18. 
34
 &7KRUQKLOOµ7KH0XWDWLRQRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZLQ&RQWHPSRUDU\&RQVWLWXWLRQV7KLQNLQJ6RFLRORJLFDOO\
DERXW3ROLWLFDO&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶Modern Law Review (2016), p. 208 at p.210. 
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ordinary citizens35. Tomkins, with his civil libertarian approach, VDOXWHV WKH µOLEHUW\-
HQKDQFLQJ DLP RI PRGHUQ KXPDQ ULJKWV¶ EXW IROORZV Griffith in considering that the 
provisions of human rights catalogues such as the European Convention of Human Rights 
DUHµVWDWHPHQWVRISROLWLFDOFRQIOLFWSUHWHQGLQJWREHUHVROXWLRQVRILW¶DUJXLQJWKDWKXPDQ
rights protection should be secured through means other than judicial enforcement36.  
Scepticism of constitutional review has also found a fertile ground outside British 
academia. Probably the most famous instance, although not the only one, is the work of 
Jeremy Waldron37. While authors such as Mark Tushnet have provided a rejection of this 
DUUDQJHPHQWEDVHGRQYHUVLRQVRIµSRSXOLVWFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶38, others such as Stephen 
Gardbaum have proposed intermediate approaches somewhere between the traditions of 
legal and political constitutionalism39.  In general, the increasing dominance of judicial 
review across the globe contrasts with the diversity of approaches to this arrangement in 
academia. 
Against the background of Kelsenian thought, many of whose traits are still dominant in 
continental Europe, scepticism of judicial review has given rise to an autonomous 
constitutional tradition that is dominant in jurisdictions like the UK, enriching the 
                                                          
35
 R. Bellamy Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
36A. Tomkins, The Role of Courts in the Political Constitution, 60 University of Toronto Law Review (2010) 
p.1 at pp.3-4. 
37
 6HH-:DOGURQµ7KH&RUHRIWKH&DVHDJDLQVW-XGLFLDO5HYLHZ¶ The Yale Law Journal (2006) p. 
1346. 
38
 M. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton U.P. 1999) 
39
 6 *DUGEDXP µ7KH &DVH IRU WKH 1HZ &RPPRQZHDOWK 0RGHO RI &RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶  GLJ (2013), 
p.2229. 
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academic and political debate on where to draw the boundaries between judicial power 
and political action. 
 
Constitutional courts under three illiberal governments 
 
The political-constitutional systems of Poland, Hungary, and Turkey could originally be 
associated, to varying degrees, with the tradition of Kelsenian-style legal 
constitutionalism, due to the existence of entrenched constitutions and constitutional 
courts. Nonetheless, these three cases constitute the most prominent examples of political 
illiberalisation on the continent of Europe in recent years. Led respectively by 
.DF]\QVNL¶V/DZDQG-XVWLFH3DUW\ in Poland, 2UEiQ¶V Fidesz party in Hungary, and the 
personalist rule of President Erdogan in Turkey, in each of the three countries the system 
of checks and balances has been put under stress, and the quality of democracy has rapidly 
eroded.  
Constitutional courts have been a common object of attack by these illiberal governments. 
The actions against constitutional courts have followed similar patterns in each of the 
three countries consisting of a combination of securing leverage over constitutional 
judges and restricting the powers of the court. How these two strategies have been 
implemented, however, has varied across the three countries. Such differences can be 
explained with reference to two factors: control over constitutional amendment and 
previous leverage over constitutional judges. Regarding the former, as suggested by 
%XJDULþFRQWURORYHUFRQVWLWXWLRQDODPHQGPHQWcan lead to a specific form of democratic 
15 
 
regression40 which, when it exists, has rendered obtaining executive leverage over 
constitutional courts less problematic. Regarding the latter, pre-existing leverage over 
constitutional judges has IDFLOLWDWHGDµFRRSHUDWLYH¶DWWLWXGHon the part of the institutions 
when governments have tried to reform them. 
For illiberal governments, obtaining leverage over constitutional judges is essential: it 
creates the scope to influence judicial decision-making and secure more favourable 
judicial outcomes. In Hungary, the Fidesz party, soon after winning the 2010 elections, 
changed the rules for nominating judges from a procedure requiring cross-party 
agreement to a two-thirds majority41, which the party enjoyed in parliament. It then 
increased the number of judges from eight to fifteen, packing the court with loyalists42. 
Leverage over judges was thus easily secured. Additionally, the powers of the court were 
constricted. Fidesz replaced the actio popularis with a more restrictive system of 
constitutional complaint.43 It also restricted the powers of the court in fiscal and budgetary 
matters44 and then the court was forbidden from using, as precedent, decisions issued 
before 2012, the year in which the constitution underwent a thorough revision under the 
auspices of the government45. The supermajority enjoyed by Fidesz that allowed it to 
change the constitution at will and legally appoint like-minded constitutional judges, 
facilitated a smooth takeover of the constitutional court in Hungary. Empirical evidence 
supports this idea. In his work on the Hungarian Constitutional Court, Szente found 
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evidence of a correlation between the voting behaviour of judges and the appointing party 
and stated that Orban ZDVVXFFHVVIXOLQµFRXUWSDFNLQJE\DSSRLQWLQJDVPDQ\QHZMXGJHV
as necessary to assure the standing support for government policy. This effort proved to 
EHVXFFHVVIXODVPRVWFRQVWLWXWLRQDO MXGJHV¶YRWHVFRLQFLGHG WRDJUHDWH[WHQWZLWK WKH
political views of their nominators, regardless of the particular constitutional problem or 
WKHVXEMHFWPDWWHURIWKHFDVH¶46 
Things were a bit trickier in Poland, where the Law and Justice government did not enjoy 
a constitutional majority. Securing leverage over constitutional judges in that country 
took place by means of more complex strategies, some of which were legally dubious. 
Soon after taking office in 2015, the new government managed to pack the court with five 
handpicked judges. To do so, it first had to refuse the swearing in of three judges that had 
been validly appointed by the previous government, plus two that the previous 
government had appointed in a legally questionable manner47. Additionally, the Law and 
Justice government retroactively voided the terms of office of the President and Vice-
President of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal48. The second, interrelated pattern was 
once again limiting the powers of the constitutional courts, and the Polish government 
followed an imaginative tactic to do so. By an amendment of the Constitutional Tribunal 
Act, a two-thirds majority was required for any court decision to be binding and the 
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quorum needed for a case to be heard was raised from nine to thirteen judges, disregarding 
the fact that there were only twelve judges on the court49. Furthermore, the reform gave 
the lower house of parliament the power to terminate D MXGJH¶V mandate50. The most 
interesting outcome of all this was a declaration of unconstitutionality of the amendments 
by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal51; this sparked a constitutional crisis between the 
institution and the government. 
The disruptive strategy followed by the Polish government thus contrasted with the 
smooth strategy followed in Hungary, but also with the exceptional developments in 
Turkey. There, events gravitated around the 2016 coup attempt, allegedly orchestrated by 
the so-called µ*OHQPRYHPHQW
DQGWKHdeclaration of a state of emergency, which gave 
extensive powers to the executive. Soon after the coup attempt, President Erdogan issued 
an emergency decree allowing the removal from office of judges for their alleged 
connection with the said coup. Immediately, the constitutional court itself removed from 
office two judges on allegations that they had connections with the coup-plotters52. Olcay 
has questioned the constitutionality of the removals and has DUJXHGWKDWµE\GLVPLVVLQJ
two of its Members upon the indirect order of the executive, the Court jeopardised its 
indispensable role in upholding the Constitution, eVSHFLDOO\XQGHUDVWDWHRIHPHUJHQF\¶53. 
The judges were subsequently replaced by two individuals appointed by President 
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Erdogan54. Additionally, the 2017 constitutional amendment will reduce the number of 
constitutional judges from 17 to 15 by abolishing two high military courts once the term 
of office of the two judges expires. The amendment has also changed the composition of 
the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, giving the President of the Republic strong 
leverage over the election of members of the Court of Cassation and the Council of State, 
each of which nominates three candidates to the Constitutional Court, two of whom are 
appointed by the President55. This shows that, although the specific strategies differed, 
the general aim of illiberal executives in all three cases has been to increase control over 
the court by securing leverage over constitutional judges. It is important to note that the 
LGHDRIµleverage¶ does not equate here to total control. Constitutional judges preserve, in 
these situations, a certain degree of agency, and declarations of the unconstitutionality of 
government legislation are not totally absent56. Yet, executive action against the 
institution is clearly intended to increase the governmental influence over judges and is 
therefore aimed at undermining the independence of the constitutional courts. 
The Turkish case was also characterised by a reduction of the powers of the constitutional 
court. The most crucial changes took place in the post-coup period, during which the 
institution reinterpreted its own powers to monitor the constitutionality of emergency 
decrees, which had become a frequent instrument of governance, asserting that they 
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would no longer be accepted for review57. Some academics feared that this would give 
Erdogan green light to pass whatever policies he wished by emergency decree, even those 
that threatened democratic guarantees58. In the end, the constitutional amendment 
promoted by Erdogan did not grant the court the power to mediate in conflicts between 
the parliament and the president in cases in which the latter had issued a decree that fell 
within the scope of powers of the legislator59. Both the case law of the court and the 2017 
amendment seemed tailor-made to facilitate presidential use of the extraordinary powers 
of the state of emergency. 
As stated above, we find evidence of similar goals - but different strategies - of illiberal 
control of constitutional courts that can be explained by a combination of control over 
constitutional amendment and prior leverage over constitutional judges. In the case of the 
Turkish constitutional court, the deterioration of the role of that institution seemed to be 
a sort of self-inflicted injury: the constitutional court itself had accepted a downgrading 
of its political role. This might be explained E\(UGRJDQ¶Vpre-existing influence over the 
constitutional judges, the latter being active in the support of reforms beneficial to the 
President. Alternatively, the attitude of the Turkish Constitutional Court might be 
explained as a form of institutional self-protection, given the state of emergency and the 
fact that many judges and prosecutors had been removed from office or imprisoned. In 
Hungary, the Fidesz government obtained a similar degree of control over the institution, 
although this had been secured precisely by the constitutional reform of 2012. The 
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capacity of the executives of Hungary and Turkey to pass constitutional amendments is 
crucial to explaining the way they approached the capture of their respective 
constitutional courts. Furthermore, in these two countries, Hungary and Turkey, the 
review benchmarks used by the respective constitutional courts are now constitutions that 
have been designed and drafted by illiberal governments, which should render their 
constitutional rulings less dangerous and more functional to the aims of the ruling elites.  
In Poland, meanwhile, the initial situation was radically different, given the constraints 
on the government. The strategy of the Polish Law and Justice party seems, in fact, to 
have been suboptimal from the viewpoint of the preferences of an illiberal government, 
as it created conflict with the institution. Executive control over the Constitutional 
Tribunal was initially precarious. Unlike in Turkey and Hungary, the Polish Constitution 
had undergone no reforms under the auspices of the illiberal government. The Law and 
Justice Party did not enjoy the two-thirds majority necessary to pass a constitutional 
amendment in a context in which a wide range of aspects pertaining to the constitutional 
court is regulated by the constitution. Paradoxically, the need of an illiberal government 
to control the constitutional court becomes more pressing if it lacks the capacity to amend 
the constitution60. For that reason, the government was forced to take recourse to ordinary 
legislation whose constitutionality was, as stated above, dubious at best61. This allowed 
the constitutional court, initially, to adopt a more resistant attitude vis-à-vis the reforms. 
Over time, however, the relationship between the Law and Justice government and the 
constitutional court has evolved to the benefit of the former. Sadurski suggests that after 
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meeting with some initial resistance, the Polish government has finally managed to secure 
control over the constitutional court62. 
 
Abusing legal constitutionalism 
 
As said above, the constitutional systems of Poland, Hungary, and Turkey could 
originally be associated with the tradition of legal constitutionalism, given the existence 
of a normative, entrenched constitution and a constitutional court tasked with protecting 
it. However, as I show in this section, illiberal interventions aimed at the constitutional 
courts in those countries have radically altered the role of these institutions. More 
specifically, I argue that there are at least three reasons why the new institutional setting 
in which illiberal constitutional courts find themselves is incompatible with the 
constitutional-protection functions of constitutional courts in the Kelsenian tradition. 
First, the original purpose of Kelsenian constitutional courts was the defence of the 
constitution, to uphold democracy in the liberal sense, i.e. as a system of limited 
government. For Kelsen, µWKHSROLWLFDOIXQFWLRQRIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQLVWRLPSRVHOHJDOOLPLWV
on the exercise of power. To give a guarantee of the constitution is to create an assurance 
WKDWWKHVHOHJDOOLPLWVZLOOQRWEHRYHUVWHSSHG¶63. This approach to constitutional review 
sharply contrasts with illiberal constitutional practices. Illiberal constitutionalism often 
removes from the constitution or weakens liberal-democratic elements that have been the 
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bread and butter of post-war constitutionalism, such as constraints on power or the 
protection of the rights of minorities. A good example of this is the concentration of 
powers vested LQWKH3UHVLGHQWLQ7XUNH\¶VQHZO\UHIRUPHGFRQVWLWXWLRQ. In Hungary, the 
FRQVWLWXWLRQ µYHVWV VRPXFKSRZHU LQ WKHFHQWUDOL]HG executive that there exist no real 
FKHFNVDQGEDODQFHVWRUHVWUDLQWKLVSRZHU¶.64 When constitutions include illiberal aspects, 
the defence of the constitution becomes something different from the defence of liberal 
democracy. In these circumstances, the benchmark for constitutional review lacks the 
elements necessary for constitutional court action to be an effective guarantee against 
illiberalism. Stated in different terms, constitutional courts lack in these contexts the tools 
to prevent democratic backsliding. As described above, this contravenes an assumption 
central to both Kelsenian thought and legal constitutionalism. 
Then there is the question of governmental control over the institution. In his writings on 
the Austrian Constitutional Court, Hans Kelsen defended the idea that constitutional 
judges should be appointed by the parliament65. But the raison d'être behind such an 
appointment procedure had to do with the maximisation of checks on the executive66. At 
one point, Kelsen suggested that the best - albeit difficult - VROXWLRQZRXOGEHWRNHHSµDOO
party-SROLWLFDOLQIOXHQFHVDZD\IURPWKHMXGLFDWXUHRIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRXUW¶67. Illiberal 
constitutionalism subverts the original Kelsenian thinking on constitutional courts - also 
in this very important respect. As we saw in the previous section, all three illiberal 
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executives carried out constitutional court reforms that were intended to secure leverage 
over constitutional judges. This has important implications for the function of 
constitutional courts vis-à-vis the protection of constitutional democracy. If we again go 
back to Kelsen, we can observe one of the reasons he feared political control over the 
constitutional court. His wordVDUHWHOOLQJµ7KHUHIRUPRIWKH$XVWULDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQLQ
1929 (...) provided that its members [of the Constitutional Court] should no longer be 
elected by the Parliament but be appointed by the Administration (...) The old Court was, 
in fact, dissolved and replaced by a new one almost all the members of which were party 
followers of the Administration. This was the beginning of a political evolution which 
inevitably had to lead to Fascism and was responsible for the fact that the annexation of 
Austria by WKH 1D]LV GLG QRW HQFRXQWHU DQ\ UHVLVWDQFH¶ 7KH SDUDGR[ of illiberal 
constitutionalism is that in the countries under study, such governmental control has been 
achieved while replicating many formal traits of the original Kelsenian court, including 
the Kelsenian idea of parliamentary appointment of constitutional judges.  
Finally, rather than guard the constitution, subjugated constitutional courts become 
instruments of illiberal executives able to alter the meaning of the constitution through 
constitutional interpretation68. Kelsen stated very concisely but insightfully that µWKH
FRQVWLWXWLRQ FDQ EH YLRODWHG RQO\ E\ WKRVH ZKR H[HFXWH LW¶69. By seizing control over 
constitutional courts, illiberal actors subvert the function of protection of the constitution 
in order to achieve the opposite. Constitutional courts become, in these contexts, tools in 
the hands of the government to circumvent the constitution or legitimise unconstitutional 
policies. In this way, illiberal governments gain the power to validate eccentric 
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interpretations of the constitution. This, again, runs contrary to the expectations of 
constitutional protection that lie at the core of the Kelsenian approach. I will return to this 
point later on in this article. 
Taken together, these three traits have an important corollary: the constitutional courts of 
Hungary, Poland, and Turkey can no longer be said, with any degree of legitimacy, to be 
Kelsenian institutions. Although they are formally modelled on the post-war 
constitutional court prototype, they are unable to perform the functions attributed to these 
institutions under legal constitutionalism. Instead, as I will show below, they perform 
roles that are functional to an illiberal understanding of constitutionalism, and which are 
more closely related to the protection of executive power than to the defence of the 
constitution.  
  
Hijacking political constitutionalism 
 
A more recent defence of illiberal reforms of constitutional courts involves an imaginative 
use of political constitutionalism. In a comment in Verfassungsblog, Adam Czarnota 
framed the events in Poland as a revival of this constitutional tradition70. He claimed that 
µ>LQ3RODQG@UHFHQWO\OHJDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPVWRSSHGWREHWKHRQO\JDPHLQWKHFLWy and 
political constitutionalism slowly is recovering ground in public discourse. It is possible 
to look at the present constitutional crisis in Poland as a struggle between two different 
YHUVLRQVRI&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPOHJDODQGSROLWLFDO¶71. In his comment, Czarnota referred to 
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3RODQG µDQG VRPH RWKHU FRXQWULHV LQ &HQWUDO-(DVWHUQ (XURSH¶ with an ambiguous 
reference that seems to allude to Hungary, albeit not explicitly72. Although Czarnota has 
acknowledged that the Law and Justice government had bent the law in order to hijack 
the constitutional court, in his view the aim was simply to draw the country closer to the 
postulates of political constitutionalism73.  
,QWKLVVHFWLRQ,GLVFXVV&]DUQRWD¶VDSSURDFKWRWKHLOOLEHUDOFRXUWV,WU\WRdefend the 
notion that any attempt to justify illiberal reforms of constitutional courts as a new form 
of political constitutionalism is misguided and misinterprets the central tenets of that 
constitutional tradition. In doing so, I will try to show why the illiberal construction of 
constitutional courts is also incompatible with political constitutionalism. 
We can identify two aspects of political constitutionalism that Czarnota tries to mobilise 
in favour of the intervention in constitutional courts in the cases under study. The first is 
the idea of deference to elected politicians. While, in the case of Poland, Czarnota 
acknowledges that the ruling party has appointed judges that represent its worldview, 
such a worldview is, according to him, VLPSO\EDVHGµRQWKHSULQFLSOHRIVXSUHPDF\RI
the Parliament in relation to constitutional review and acceptance of a rule of judicial 
UHVWUDLQWQRWMXGLFLDODFWLYLVPZKLFKZDVHDUOLHUWKHQRUP¶74.The second aspect of political 
constitutionalism mobilised by the author is the idea of a ³thin´ political constitution. 
Citing Blokker, he claims that the effect of legal constitutionalism in Poland has EHHQµD
very shallow institutionalisation of the rule of law and the creation of a closed legal 
system which excluded citizens from constitutional matters. The place of excluded 
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FLWL]HQV ZDV WDNHQ E\ ODZ\HUV¶75. Providing a quite accurate description of political 
constitutionalism, he notes that, according to this constitutional tradition, µWKHFRQVWLtution 
belongs to the whole nation and citizens should have the opportunity to interpret and use 
LW LQ WKHLU HYHU\GD\ DFWLYLWLHV « 7KH FRQVWLWXWLRQ LV QRW DQ DFW EXW D never ending 
dialogue DQGSRVWXODWHVJUHDWHUSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIFLWL]HQV¶76. He FRQFOXGHVE\VD\LQJµ:KDW
happened in Poland, but also in other countries of Central-Eastern Europe is that legal 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP DOLHQDWHG WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQ IURP FLWL]HQV « , LQWHUSUHW WKH SUHVHQW
constitutional crisis in Poland and some other countries in Central-Eastern Europe as an 
DWWHPSWWRWDNHWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQVHULRXVO\DQGUHWXUQLWWRWKHFLWL]HQV¶77. 
&]DUQRWD¶V DUJXPHQWV are imaginative and sometimes capture the gist of political 
constitutionalism, but I believe there are at least two reasons to reject his analysis. The 
first is rather basic. Simply stated, illiberal governments do not question the capacity of a 
judicial-type organ - a constitutional court - to invalidate legislation passed by parliament, 
as an honest attempt to implement political constitutionalism in these countries would 
require. On the contrary, illiberal constitutional courts still preserve, de iure, their 
capacity to declare the unconstitutionality of legislation. Instead of questioning this 
power, illiberal governments simply seize control of constitutional courts and use such 
power for their own political purposes, as I will show in the next section. I believe this 
SRLQWZRXOGVXIILFHWRUHMHFWPDQ\RI&]DUQRWD¶VFODLPV 
The second reason is more theoretically elaborate. Under political constitutionalism, the 
political constitution is based on demanding mechanisms of political accountability and 
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checks on power. As put by Gee and Webber, µOHJDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVWVVRPHWLPHVSUHVHQW
the vagaries of ordinary, everyday political life as potentially destructive of the rule of 
law and individual rights and which, therefore, must be constrained by judicially 
enforceable constitutional prescriptions. Instead, the normative turn in political 
constitutioQDOLVPZULWLQJRIIHUVDQDFFRXQWRIKRZSROLWLFVVHUYHVDVWKH³YHKLcOH´WKURXJK
ZKLFKWRUHDOL]HWKHVHVDPHDQGRWKHUHQGV¶78. Modern day political constitutionalists 
have proposed a wide range of such political arrangements to protect democracy. In 
Tomkins, the prevailing mechanism is ministerial responsibility and accountability to 
Parliament79. In Bellamy, it is the democratic process and the law-making function, 
emphasising majority rule in addition to party competition and periodic elections80. 
Furthermore, if we go back to Griffith¶s original argument, we can observe a strong 
emphasis on accountability µ$IXUWKHUDGYDQWDJH LQ WUHDWLQJZKDWRWKHUVFDOO ULJKWVDV
political claims is that their acceptance or rejection will be on the hands of politicians 
rather than judges and the advantage of that is not that politicians are more likely to come 
up with the right answer but that, as I have said, they are so much more vulnerable than 
judges and can be dismissed or at least made to suffer their reputDWLRQ¶81. 
The question is not whether political constitutionalism demands that no constraints on 
power should exist. Rather, it claims that such constraints ought to be political in nature. 
The dismantling of such constraints is, therefore, incompatible with political 
constitutionalism and, more particularly, undermines the very premise allowing this 
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constitutional tradition to claim that constitutional review is unnecessary. Political 
constitutionalism argues that legal constraints on power and institutions such as a 
constitutional court are unnecessary because strict political constraints are enough to hold 
such power to account. However, what we see in the countries under scrutiny is precisely 
the slow dismantling of such political constraints. In Hungary, the Fidesz party not only 
took control of the constitutional court but also restructured the electoral commission so 
as to gain control over it82. It staffed the media council with its own members and then 
expanded its regulatory powers over the press83. It took control of institutions such as the 
national audit office, the public prosecutors, and the judicial council84. It lowered the 
retirement age of judges to gain control over the ordinary judiciary and fired the data-
protection Ombudsman85. The recent attacks on the Central European University and civil 
society groups86 are only the latest episodes in the process of illiberalisation in Hungary. 
In Poland, the Law and Justice government has passed laws dismissing all the boards of 
public-service broadcasters and giving their control to the Treasury Ministry87. In addition 
to seizing control of the constitutional court, the government also fired all judges of the 
Supreme Court and replaced the leadership of the lower courts, while taking over control 
over the system of judicial appointments88. In Turkey, over 150.000 people were detained 
in the aftermath of the coup, including the purge of soldiers, police, judicial officials, civil 
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servants, academics and schoolteachers89. Furthermore, the subsequent constitutional 
amendment put even more power into the hands of the President of the Republic, placing 
the system of checks and balances in the country under stress. Events in the countries 
under study have not only undermined the legal checks on power but also eroded political 
constraints and accountability, which are at the core of political constitutionalism.  
/HWXVUHWXUQWR*ULIILWK,Qµ7KH3ROLWLFDO&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶, he clearly defines the political 
premise upon which his view of constitutionalism is based: µ,EHOLHYHILUPO\WKDWSROLWLFDO
decisions should be taken by politicians. In a society like ours this means by people who 
are removable. It is an obvious corollary of this that the responsibility and accountability 
of our rulers should be real and not fictitious. And of course, our existing institutions, 
especially the House of Commons need strengthening. And we need to force governments 
out of secrecy and into the open. So also the freedom of the Press should be enlarged by 
amendment of the laws which restrict discussion. Governments are too easily able to act 
in an authoritarian manner. But the remedies are political. It is not by attempting to restrict 
the legal powers of government that we shall defeat authoritarianism. It is by insisting on 
RSHQJRYHUQPHQW¶90. Griffith¶VYLHZZDVQRW that granting all powers to the parliament 
was sufficient for the political constitution to work smoothly, but rather that this had to 
happen in the context of a number of political conditions that he mentions. We can refer 
to these as the underlying preconditions of political constitutionalism. What we have 
witnessed in Poland, Hungary, and Turkey is precisely the undermining of such 
preconditions. 
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Finally, all of the above also provide compelling reasons to reject one final potential claim 
in defence of the reforms in the three analysed countries. No such claim was made by 
Czarnota, but I believe it is relevant to the discussion in this section. The hypothetical 
argument would be that because constitutional courts are particularly useful for countries 
in transition to democracy91, once the transition is complete those institutions become 
unnecessary. Although this final argument is compelling, there are at least two grounds 
to reject it. The first is that, although it is empirically true that constitutional courts are 
often instituted in new-born democracies, this does not imply that they would not also be 
normatively desirable in consolidated democracies. The second reason is that the events 
in the three countries under study seem to disprove the very idea that they are consolidated 
democracies. Rather, even assuming that they had been at some point in the last decades, 
these countries are now facing a clear risk of undergoing democratic deconsolidation. A 
powerful, independent and functional constitutional court is, for precisely that reason, 
more necessary than ever.  
 
The inverted constitutional court: constitutional review under illiberal rule 
 
The examples of Hungary, Poland, and Turkey show that we are witnessing the 
emergence of a new approach to constitutional review: the illiberal constitutional court, 
which now constitutes a tertium genus beyond legal constitutionalism and political 
constitutionalism. These institutions can be described as inverted courts: rather than 
exercise constitutional checks on political actors, illiberal constitutional courts become 
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devices used by illiberal actors to rid themselves of constitutional checks in the context 
of hybrid regimes92. This phenomenon, at the conceptual level, challenges our very notion 
of constitutionalism. If, with Sartori, we define constitutionalism as µa fundamental law, 
or a fundamental set of principles, and a correlative institutional arrangement, which 
would restrict arbitrary power aQG HQVXUH D ³OLPLWHG JRYHUQPHQW´¶93, then illiberal 
constitutional practice can be defined as a new (un)constitutional tradition. 
This disregard for constitutional constraints has dramatic consequences for constitutional 
courts, and for the idea of the normativity of the constitution. The notion of a normative 
constitution simply implies that constitutional provisions ought to be respected by public 
authorities and citizens and that they should be enforced. Illiberal constitutional courts 
are, from a constitutional theory perspective, devices of the de-normativisation of the 
constitution. In this regard, the illiberal approach to constitutional courts displays at least 
four distinct traits: 
 
1. Opportunistic instrumentalism. Cas Mudde asserts that populist actors tend 
to have an instrumental attitude towards constitutionalism94, as is the case 
regarding their approach to constitutional courts. Rather than adopting a 
coherent attitude towards these institutions, their discourse and political 
practices shift according to the political needs and opportunities of the 
moment. Before securing control over constitutional courts, illiberal populists 
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often frame these institutions as elite organs that constrain the exercise of the 
popular will, especially when judicial decisions run counter to their 
preferences95. However, as I suggested earlier in this article, once illiberals 
come to power, their approach mutates. On the one hand, they tend to curb 
the powers of constitutional courts in all those aspects that could constrain 
their rule, render the institution innocuous. The best example of this is the ban 
on the use of judicial precedent in Hungary, as explained above. On the other 
hand, however, they tend to maintain the FRXUWV¶SRZHUV to the extent that 
they have secured control over the institution and can exploit it to their own 
benefit, especially as a means of getting rid of constitutional constraints. The 
result is an ad hoc, tailor-made institutional design, which is not intended to 
protect the normative constitution but rather the political interests of the 
executive. 
 
2. Transformation of a constitutional constraint into a legitimising tool. The 
former point bears a very important consequence. Under an illiberal design, 
constitutional courts are weakened in their role as a constitutional constraint 
on power. While formally retaining the power to overturn government-
backed legislation, the de facto ability of the illiberal constitutional court to 
do so is severely curtailed, given the leverage of the ruling party over 
constitutional judges96, the selective restriction of court powers and ± if the 
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illiberals have drafted a new constitution - the innocuous nature of the 
benchmark for review. However, this type of court has an important 
ornamental function: it creates an aspect of normalcy in an otherwise 
constitutionally abnormal situation. In other words, it becomes a legitimising 
organ97, which preserves for the political system of the country a democratic 
appearance without implementing the checks on power that are at the core of 
liberal conceptions of constitutionalism.  
 
 
3. Tool of constitutional mutation. In addition, in these contexts, the 
constitutional court can be used to carry out processes of constitutional 
mutation, in which new meaning is attributed to the constitution to meet the 
changing preferences of the illiberal government. This is a phenomenon 
already masterfully explained by Brewer-Carías in the case of Venezuela98, 
and Sadurski in the case of Poland99. Illiberal processes of constitutional 
mutation can be carried out in a variety of ways. First, the constitutional court 
can declare materially unconstitutional legislation passed by the ruling 
majority to be constitutional. Second, the court can reject the review of the 
merits of unconstitutional legislation, thus de facto giving it green light. 
Third, the constitutional court can declare the unconstitutionality of 
materially constitutional legislation passed by a previous government. We 
have already seen an example of this in Turkey, i.e. the emergency decrees. 
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In the case of Poland, Sadurski has mentioned examples including the 
regulations imposed RQ WKH &RXQFLO RI WKH -XGLFLDU\ WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V
prerogative of granting pardons, and the statute on the Supreme Court, all of 
which were legitimised by the court100. As that author put it, those episodes 
VKRZ WKDW WKH 3ROLVK &RQVWLWXWLRQDO &RXUW µLV not merely paralyzed but 
actually used as a positive aid in dismantling constitutional guarantees and 
VWUXFWXUHV¶101. When constitutional courts are used by illiberal governments 
to reinterpret constitutional texts, the latter become devoid of normative 
content: constitutional provisions no longer have a meaning independent of 
the meaning that the illiberal government, aided by the constitutional court, 
forces them to have102. While political struggles over meaning have always 
played a role in constitutional interpretation103, what we see in these cases is 
an indirect yet strong governmental political control of interpretative activity 
that erodes the nature of the normative constitution as a legal constraint on 
power104.  
 
4. Creation of perverse constitutional incentives. Finally, the traits mentioned 
above are likely to have as a consequence the creation of perverse incentives. 
These, in turn, further help consolidate the power of the government and 
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hasten the loss of the normativity of the constitution. Take, for instance, 
.\ULWVLV¶ DUJXPHQW on the incentives for the legislator created by 
constitutional review. According to that author, in a normal situation, 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO UHYLHZ µFDQ DFWXDOO\ HQKDQFH WKH OHJLVODWRUV¶ VHQVH RI
constitutional responsibility, insofar as the latter will want to avoid the 
embarrassment of being exposed to the criticisms that they have violated the 
FRQVWLWXWLRQ¶105. By removing the threat of punishment for unconstitutional 
action, the illiberal construction of constitutional courts creates a perverse 
incentive, namely by favouring an increase in the passing of unconstitutional 
legislation. Furthermore, the lack of efficacy of the constitutional court can 
create a second perverse incentive: if opposition members deem actions 
brought before the institution to be useless, they will end up bringing fewer 
cases, thereby allowing unconstitutional legislation to pass easily. 
 
These four traits converge in one phenomenon: the de-normativisation of the constitution, 
which is achieved through executive influence over the constitutional court. This does not 
necessarily mean that constitutions fulfil no real function in these political systems. 
Constitutional provisions still provide for the basic institutional setting and rules of the 
polity. And constitutional courts might retain, to varying degrees, a modicum of agency 
to enforce such rules. But executive leverage over the institution weakens constitutional 
constraints on power. And by giving green light to government-backed legislation, the 
constitutional court legitimises executive action. The constitution becomes in these 
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FRQWH[WV µVRIWHU¶ DQG more amenable to instrumental manipulation. Leverage over the 
constitutional court allows the government to implement its political agenda with less fear 
of constitutional restrictions, while at the same time claiming that its actions are fully 
constitutional and, therefore, legitimate.  
The corollary is that constitutional courts are not institutions that illiberal governments 
feel compelled to maintain despite a secret willingness to get rid of them. Rather, these 
institutions are functional to the illiberal system of governance and fulfil a central role in 
the illiberal form of constitutionalism. They allow a subtle transfer of constitutional 
power that is characteristic of illiberalism: executive control of the constitutional court 
indirectly gives the government an important say in how the constitution should be 
interpreted. In political constitutionalism, the parliament is sovereign and constitutes the 
ultimate source of constitutional rules. In legal constitutionalism, the constitutional court 
has the last say over constitutional provisions. In illiberal constitutionalism, such powers 
of constitutional interpretation are gradually shifted from the constitutional court towards 
the executive. These systems maintain the appearance of a government subject to the 
constitution, yet they are engineered to produce a system of constitutionalism subject to 
the government. Executive control over the constitution is often not absolute in illiberal 
constitutionalism, though. Empirically existing illiberal systems often face constraints 
that force them to depart from that ideal model: constitutional courts cannot always be 
fully dominated, opposition politicians often cannot be fully silenced, internal and 
international pressure forces illiberal governments to preserve real democratic elements, 
etc. At a more abstract level, however, illiberal disregard for checks on powers tends to 
lead to a scenario characterised by the de-normativisation of the constitution and the 
granting of the last say in constitutional matters to the executive.  
37 
 
According to Michel Rosenfeld, illiberal constitutionalism KDVµXVHG WKH ODQJXDJHDQG
WRROVRIOLEHUDOFRQVWLWXWLRQVWRWXUQWKHPDJDLQVWWKHODWWHU¶106. After exploring the cases 
of Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, this statement must be taken literally. Inverting their 
functions, illiberal governments in these countries have gained substantial leverage over 
the institutions that should protect the constitution, precisely in order to undermine the 
normativity of the latter. This has a very important implication: If the mandates of the 
constitution which, from a Kelsenian perspective, constitutes the source of validity of the 
legal system as a whole, no longer need to be respected, then a political community cannot 
be said to be ruled by law, but rather by the commands of a particular set of political 
actors that are above the law. The idea of rule of law slowly vanishes, in direct proportion 
to the loss of normativity of the constitution.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In this article, I have argued that the institutional design and functions performed by the 
illiberal constitutional courts of Hungary, Poland, and Turkey are incompatible with the 
normative foundations of both legal and political constitutionalism. At the same time, 
however, the analysis of illiberal constitutionalism is instructive with regard to these two 
constitutional traditions. Regarding political constitutionalism, processes of 
constitutional illiberalisation show that the political preconditions that make democracy 
possible are sometimes weak and easy to erode. This is relevant; constitutional review 
sceptics such as Jeremy Waldron base their rejection of this arrangement on the premise 
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that, in a polity, democracy is solid and has a sufficient degree of consolidation107. The 
backsliding in young democracies that seemed poised to overcome authoritarianism, like 
Poland and Hungary108, shows the fragility of that premise.  
The relationship between illiberalism and legal constitutionalism is tenser yet also more 
straightforward, especially because the countries studied here could be said to have 
belonged, at some point prior to their illiberalisation, to the group of continental 
Kelsenian-inspired legal systems. On the one hand, the cases show that illiberal 
governments do fear constitutional courts, as illustrated by the fact that, once in power, 
achieving control over these institutions was one of their primary goals. On the other 
hand, however, constitutional courts have been largely unable to resist illiberal tendencies 
in these countries and to prevent democratic backsliding. This puts constitutional courts 
in a difficult position, as the protection of democracy was, as we have seen earlier, one of 
their main raisons G¶rWUH. Failure by Kelsenian-inspired constitutionalism to live up to its 
promise to protect democracy in the event illiberal actors reach power forces us to think 
seriously about how to improve this approach to political democracy, in order to meet the 
new challenges posed by authoritarian political actors in Europe and beyond. 
Furthermore, these damaged constitutional courts will remain in place once the illiberal 
governments finally lose power. Future political majorities will have to face the task of 
restoring these institutions and their function in legal constitutionalism: acting like a real 
constraint on power and an actual guardian of the democratic constitution. Reform of 
constitutional courts packed with judges loyal to the former illiberal government, 
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dysfunctional from the perspective of their institutional design, and accustomed to the 
inertia of the illiberal period, will prove a formidable task. 
Illiberal constitutionalism constitutes a novel (un)constitutional form of legal-political 
practice. Instead of giving the last say on constitutional matters to the constitutional court 
(as in legal-constitutional systems) or to the parliament (as in political constitutionalism), 
in illiberal systems, the executive is the ultimate locus of constitutional power. Through 
their control of the constitutional court, actors in power gain the capacity to bend and 
change constitutional provisions, depriving them of actual normativity. This not only 
undermines the idea of power subject to checks but also the notion of power subject to 
the law. Far from being of minor importance, attacks on constitutional courts are central 
to the processes of political illiberalisation: what is at stake in these episodes is the 
preservation of the very idea of democracy and the rule of law.  
